Edward Luttwak, the great military strategist, wrote a famous essay in entitled “Give War a Chance.” He was not kidding. The piece. The Civilian Cost of War and What This Means for Sendero. The Military 1 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs 78/. in the East African and Andrew Mwenda in the Independent both borrowed heavily from Edward Luttwak’s essay, “Give War a Chance,”.

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James Currey Press, The latter will show possible success in intervention by military means.

Instead, what is being here advanced is a probabilistic approach asserting that they can. A key aspect of this argument is to assert that peace operations can never extinguish the flames of conflict, it can only reduce them to embers which will inevitably return to inferno.

This euphoria did not last long. Indiana University Press,vii-viii. What must be called into question is the development of a perpetual war mentality and machine. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Additionally, he asserts that wars have not progressed towards this outcome, due to meddling on the part of the Global North. Firstly, that success in intervention is possible through political means. Though this paper does not seek to delve too deeply into the methodological debate of comparative analysis, it is essential for the argument that such problems be addressed.

Putin is the new Hitler. James Currey Press, David Keen argued that corruption within the Nigerian government led to a lack of pay for soldiers, who David Keen points out, were then forced chnace abuse the population out of necessity.

The edwrd will show that low-level international involvement can be successful in bringing closure to conflict using primarily political means. A complex history of this intervention is not required, its military successes are well documented in the literature on Sierra Leone. Stephen Morrison and Alex De Waal asserted that it was only the effort of third-party mediators — with committed low-level involvement — to edwaard to compel belligerents of the Sudanese Civil War to break the deadlock and embrace peace.

In the face of a protracted war on their borders, local states intervened in the South Sudanese Civil War in order to protect and pursue their own interests. According to the predominant U.


There is a problem of massive multicollinearity here, though Luttwak adopts an essentially monocausal explanation for the continuation of conflict.

Life is much too complicated for simple answers. Causal factors of both greed and grievance chahce existed prior to a failed intervention will exist afterwards if not addressed, and at best, can only change hands as one belligerent force seeks dominance over another. Twenty-First Century Peace Operations.

Disinterest and Frivolity: Assessing Luttwak’s ‘Give War a Chance’

A Dirty War in West Africa: Though this essay is not attempting to assert that Naivasha was a complete success — there are problems with it, as there are with any peace process — the role that the international community played, and the successes encountered, cannot be ignored.

The falseness of each assumption, combined with the existence of examples to the contrary, lead the argument to be deprived of validity. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.

Secondly, that withdrawal and disinterest worsens conflict. After a very short lull from totheir discourse has returned to the belligerent language used during the Cold War.

By the way, neither is a soldier nor threatened by conscription. Peace and love were in the air. The response to this state of perpetual war does not have to be pacifism. This vigilance has taken on new forms; the enemy has a different name, but the high quotient of fear is still there. This concept, influenced heavily by Clauswitzian thinking, asserts that we can assign a clear beginning and end date to any conflict.

September 11,exploded the illusion of universal peace. There seem to be few historical examples which would support this view. There may be cases where intervention worsens conflict, however conflict is much more likely to progress due to a failure to address the greed or grievance factors which led to its outbreak in the first place.

It must be acknowledged that it is impossible to identity all intervening variables in any process tracing account of conflict, and it is therefore logically impossible to assert that a certain sequence of events would have happened. A new era of fear, uncertainty and military spending began. Perhaps the former will go down in history as an aberration, a very short moment of euphoria in an otherwise endless march of belligerence, confrontation and war.


The first example explored here will assert the potential success of intervention by political means, and the role that both third-party mediation and low-level Western involvement can play in a successful peace process.

It is Luttwak himself who is guilty of being overly determinist in his assertions that war will bring peace. Though Luttwak does use some examples to back his argument, the conclusion that one or several failures necessitates that t is necessary to here analyze each assumption based on its individual merits — or lack thereof — and then to assess them collectively by testing them against actual case studies.

The ECOMOG mission — which was marked by human rights abuses, summary executions, and collusion with rebels — is unlikely to find many defenders.

Give War a Chance

Neo-conservatives are now being called the War Party. Terrorists and terrorism are not the same as the Soviet Union and communism, although the Islamic State is now presented as a unified entity.

This causes a causality dilemma, in which intervention of a conflict is granted causality for war instead of the actual causal mechanisms which caused it in the first place.

Whereas Sudan provides an example of a protracted conflict brought to a close by a successful political process, Sierra Leone provides an example of an intervention encountered through military means.

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New and Old Wars: A simple rational actor approach would assert that leaders of states bordering countries at conflict will intervene in whatever way they see fit to pursue their own interests. Donations are voluntary and not required to download the e-book – your link to download is below. In argument addressing what should or could have happened, adopting a counterfactual view of history is inevitable.

As David Keen noted, the Sierra Leonean Civil War was marked by its gratuitous violence and predation wa both government and rebels, and was largely ignored or misconstrued by the international community.

United States Institute of Peace, A caveat must be added here, which addresses the role of counterfactual analysis in this argument.