WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport. operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and. Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN. Counterinsurgency Warfare provides the template for the defeat of today’s Galula served as a French military officer in WWII asd afterwords in various outposts.
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Asymmetry Between the Insurgent and the Counterinsurgent. I read this in earl when I was trying to learn more about counterinsurgency war and the “surge” that the US forces were promoting in Iraq.
Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body warfaer armed insurgents. It’s amazing how the more things change, the more they stay the same. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. This “compass” is comprised of the laws and principals of counterinsurgency warfare, and corresponding strategy and tactics. Very interesting use of historical examples.
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 33, Iss 5, p. To view it, click here.
At the heart of this political machine is the development of a counterinsurgent cause to compete with the insurgent cause. Citing Beyond Intractability resources. Very interesting use of historical examples. From Strategy to Tactics. Jul 24, David rated it it was ok. While counterinsurgents are powerful, they are glula to uphold law and order, which limits their potential action. Jan 16, SpaceBear rated it really liked it Shelves: And yet, in these wars, the civilians barely showed.
Account Options Sign in. Counterinsurgejcy the “father” of COIN doctrine. I’d highly recommend it for anyone interested in the topic. Galula lays out the basic steps of an insurgency or revolutionary war and galulaa steps neccessary to combat or suppress one. Skip to main content. Inspired by his military experiences as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, the author realized the “need for a compass” in the suppression of insurgency, and he set out to “define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.
A victory [in a counherinsurgency is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. His strategy is divided into eight steps: Greenwood Publishing Group- History – pages.
The former nation opted to go along with a military-backed, anti-Communist pogrom that consumed hundreds of thousands in lives. While important in “cold” insurgencies, this is the primary activity of counterinsurgents in “hot” insurgencies. warfwre
Counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate counterknsurgency. The other book I was reading at the time – Horne’s history of the Algerian war — was far su Wrafare read this in earl when I was trying to learn more about counterinsurgency war and the “surge” that the US forces were promoting in Iraq.
There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war – and to a good extent, the war in Afghanistan as well – represents.
A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population.
Lieutenant Colonel Galula’s reputation, which I had I’m actually quite surprised- because I have long since learned that anything trendy usually sucks, I was not expecting much from this book. Written inbut remains sound from everything I have read on the subject.
This simple statement can be observed in many social causes today. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Tactics Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics.
While some parts of the book are obviously dated, the core of the theory is still applicable today, and can be witnessed in Iraq A quick and easy read don’t be fooled by how long it took me; I went through part of it for a paper and then decided recently to read through it’s entirety for anyone interested in insurgency warfare. New to the site? While the book is primarily concerned with insurgency, it often refers to both revolutions and plots as well. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject.
In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms counyerinsurgency political organization at the grass roots. Galula’s work on counter-insurgency is in large part based on the experiences and lesson of years of French colonial warfare, most notably the work yalula Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. Thus, the objective of the conflict is the peop Watfare, lucid, clear how-to manual on defeating insurgencies.
While the latter, under the hands of its colonial master, settled instead for a politically-based, police-centric counterinsurgency against the guerillas.
Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula | Brendan Kelly –
Galula resigned his commission in to study in the United Stateswhere he obtained a position of research associate at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. Gaoula Power of Ideology. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. In it, Galula, a French military officer with experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, seeks to provide a “compass” for the counterinsurgent, much as Mao did for the revolutionary.
But Galula also got a lot of other stuff right, and he deserves credit for his insights. This book provides an analysis of how to countermine insurgency and the elements that might hinder its defeat.
The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. A must read for anyone who wants to understand what the US is attempting to do now in Iraq and how the majority of the wars of the future will be fought.